The war in Ukraine has exposed a stark reality: while the European Union has thrown its financial weight behind Kyiv, it has failed to unite in a way that truly strengthens Europe as a whole. This raises a critical question: is the EU capable of transforming crises into opportunities for deeper integration, or is it destined to remain a patchwork of individual efforts?
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022, the EU has undeniably stepped up, funneling substantial funds to help Ukraine defend itself. Yet, unlike past crises that spurred the transfer of new powers to Brussels and led to institutional growth, this conflict has highlighted persistent challenges. The EU has struggled to overcome collective action problems when it comes to sharing military responsibilities and financing a unified defense. Instead, a smaller group of member states—those geographically closer to Russia and with healthier fiscal positions in 2022—have shouldered the lion’s share of military aid to Ukraine and Europe’s broader rearmament efforts.
And this is the part most people miss: With geography being a fixed factor and fiscal adjustments happening at a snail’s pace, these ‘coalitions of the willing’ are likely to remain the primary drivers of Europe’s military response to Russian aggression. Meanwhile, the EU as a whole will continue to play a crucial role in financing Ukraine’s defense and, by extension, the development of a credible European military deterrent against Russia. However, the EU’s inability to agree on deeper political and institutional integration since 2022 suggests that future crises may not automatically lead to a more unified Europe.
But here’s where it gets controversial: Is the EU’s current approach—relying on subgroups of member states to lead military efforts—sustainable in the long term? Or does it risk creating a two-tier Europe, where some countries bear the brunt of defense responsibilities while others remain more insulated? This raises broader questions about solidarity, fairness, and the very future of European integration. What do you think? Is the EU’s current strategy sufficient, or does it need a bolder vision for collective defense and unity?
Finally, a personal note of gratitude: I’m deeply thankful to my colleagues at Bruegel and PIIE—Adam Posen, Nicolas Véron, Angel Ubide, Olivier Blanchard, Cullen Hendrix, Maury Obstfeld, Patrick Honahan, Alan Wolff, Guntram Wolff, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Zsolt Darvas, Lucio Pench, André Sapir, and Stephen Gardner—for their invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. Any remaining errors or oversights are, of course, entirely my own.
